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Abstract
To give a better understanding that, when the economy is caught up in a liquidity trap,
it returns quickly to the normal state by using the exchange rate channel of monetary policy,
we solved a central bank’s intertemporal optimization problem in the framework of a small
open economy. Given an adverse shock to aggregate demand, we computed the dynamic path
of a short-term nominal interest rate in both discretion and commitment. We discovered that
the timing to terminate a zero interest rate policy in the case of large openness would be earlier
than that in the case of small openness. We ﬁnd that the economy in case of large openness
would be less overheated. Moreover, the di#erence between the optimal solution and discre-
tionary solution becomes proportionately smaller to the degree of openness. Some simulation
results reinforce these ﬁndings. Finally, this paper also suggests that the exchange rate peg
enables the central bank to quickly end the zero interest rate policy.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: E31; E52; E58; E61
Keywords: zero bound on nominal interest rates; zero interest rate policy; liquidity trap; degree
of openness; small open economy
I Introduction
The Bank of Japan (BOJ) adopted the so-called zero interest rate policy (ZIRP) to
stimulate the Japanese economy from February 1999 to August 2000.
1 On February 12, 1999,
the BOJ adopted this policy in order to avoid a possible intensiﬁcation of deﬂationary pressure.
 I would like to thank Professors Koichiro Takaoka and Tsutomu Watanabe for their advice and encourage-
ment. I also wish to thank Takeshi Kudo and an anonymous refree for helpful comments.
1 Thereafter, the decision of the BOJ policy board was made on March 19, 2001 as follows: (1) The main
operating target for money market operations be changed from the current uncollateralized overnight call rate to
the outstanding balance of the current accounts at the Bank of Japan. (2) The new procedures for money market
operations continue to be in place until the consumer price index (excluding perishables, on nationwide statistics)
registers stably a zero percent or an increase year on year. (3) For the time being, the balance outstanding at the
Bank’s current accounts be increased to around 5 trillion yen, or 1 trillion yen increase from the average 4 trillion
yen outstanding in February 2001.
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the overnight interest rate at zero until “deﬂationary concerns are dispelled.” This announce-
ment was intended to have the e#ect of lowering longer term interest rates by altering the
expectations of market participants. This policy to escape from a liquidity trap by a#ecting
market expectations has revived researchers’ interest in the zero bound on nominal interest
rates.
Krugman (1998) suggests that the BOJ should make a commitment to future monetary
expansion and proposes an inﬂation target whereby the Japanese economy needs four percent
per year for the next 15 years. When the nominal interest rate is bound at zero, an increase in
inﬂation expectations brings about a reduction in the real interest rate and thereby stimulates
the economy out of the liquidity trap. On the other hand, Woodford (1999) points out that,
even when the current overnight interest rate is close to zero, the long-term nominal interest
rate could be well above zero if future overnight rates are expected to be well above zero.
Expectations theory of the term structure of interest rates implies that, in this situation, a
central bank could lower the long-term nominal interest rate by committing itself to an
expansionary monetary policy in the future, thereby stimulating aggregate demand.
Many suggestions are also o#ered for escaping from the liquidity trap in the framework
of an open economy. Bernanke (2000) and Meltzer (2000) recommend that the BOJ lowers
the yen to increase net exports and stop deﬂation by large-scale intervention. Their arguments
rely on a portfolio-balance e#ect, whereby the relative supply of domestic and foreign currency
denominated assets a#ects the exchange rate. In contrast to the above recommendations to
manipulate the market rate by artiﬁcial intervention, Svensson (2000a) proposes to control
market expectations about the future values of the currency. His argument does not rely on a
portfolio-balance channel, but on a credible commitment to an expansionary policy. This
method emphasizes an operation mechanism to change the current exchange rate by a#ecting
market expectations of future exchange rates.
Since the ZIRP is adopted unavoidably to escape from an emergency situation, this policy
seems to be terminated at some point in the future. Under this environment, an important
point is the timing to end this policy. In other words, a central bank needs to specify and
announce a contingency plan describing how long the ZIRP would be continued, i.e., when
and under what circumstances the ZIRP should be terminated. The BOJ did this in its
commitment of April 13, 1999, but its termination condition was very ambiguous. In practice,
when the BOJ terminated a ZIRP on August 11, 2000, the government requested that the
Policy Board postpone a vote on the proposed change of the guideline for money market
operations until the next Monetary Policy Meeting.
2 At that time, the Director General of the
Economic Planning Agency said that the BOJ had taken an optimistic view regarding the
Japanese economy and the BOJ should have postponed terminating the ZIRP because
deﬂationary concerns were not completely dispelled.
As stated above, we did not have a clear understanding of the deﬁnition of “deﬂationary
concerns,” which was a condition to end the ZIRP. More fundamentally, there was doubt as
to whether the BOJ’s termination condition was really appropriate. Many researchers and
practitioners have said that the BOJ’s policy might have been mistaken. Jung, et al. (2001)
2 Pursuant to Article 19, Section 3 of the Bank of Japan Law, the Policy Board took a vote on this request and
rejected it by majority vote.
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +-*investigated this problem in order to evaluate the BOJ’s policy. Their main ﬁnding was that the
optimal path is characterized by monetary policy inertia: the ZIRP should be continued for
some time, even after the natural rate of interest returns to a positive level.
But Jung, et al. (2001) lacks the element of open economy, i.e., exchange rate
mechanism.
3 The objective of this paper is to evaluate the ZIRP under the framework of a
small open economy. The commitment of keeping the nominal interest rate at zero is expected
to give rise to a weakening domestic currency and thereby lead to the improvement of output
gap and deﬂation. As a result, it is supposed that the period of the ZIRP would be reduced.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setting of the demand
and supply side under the framework of a small open economy, which is based on Gali and
Monacelli (2002).
4 Section 3 and Section 4 characterize discretionary and commitment
solutions to the problem. Section 5 gives a numerical example. Section 6 concludes the paper.
II The Model
1. Central bank’s loss function
The central bank chooses the path of the short-term nominal interest rates, starting from






where b is the discount factor and L is the loss function. Denoting domestic inﬂation by pH,t,
which is deﬁned as the rate of change in the index of domestic goods prices, and output gap




where l is a positive parameter representing the weight assigned to output stability, p ¯ H denotes
the domestic inﬂation target and x ¯denotes the target level of the output gap. Denoting the real
exchange rate by qt and the share of domestic consumption allocated to imported goods, i.e.,




which makes the gap between two measures of inﬂation dependent on the change in the real
exchange rate and the coe$cient given by the index of openness.
3 Of course, Japan is not a small open economy. But the essence of investigation made here applies to the case
of a large open economy. Under existing environments where low and stable inﬂation has been achieved in many
countries, in cases where the economy is hit by a large-scale negative shock, most countries have the possibility of
being caught up in a liquidity trap like Japan.
4 The characteristic of Gali and Monacelli (2002) is that it is laid out as a small open economy with Calvo-type
staggered price-setting that is now common in the recent New Keynesian literatures. Another feature lies in the
modeling of the rest of the world as a limiting case of an economy whose degrees of openness are negligible. This
allows us to treat the rest of the world as if it were a closed economy.
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Following Gali and Monacelli (2002), the small open economy outside the central bank








where it is the short-term nominal interest rate, r
n




)a n dw1g(2g)(sh1) are positive parameters. The natu-
ral rate of interest is an exogenous variable that could deviate from its steady-state level,
thereby giving rise to ﬂuctuations in the output gap and the inﬂation rate.
5 We also assume
that h, a and * are positive parameters.
Equation (2.4) states that output gap in period t is determined by the expected value of
the output gap in period t1, the deviation of the short-term real interest rate from the natural
rate of interest in period t, and the expected change of the real exchange rate in period t1.
















tj] stands for the deviation of the long-term real interest rate from the
corresponding natural rate of interest in period t, which implies that, given the path of the
natural rate of interest, the output gap depends negatively on the long-term real interest rate.
We ﬁnd that the output gap would depend positively on the real exchange rate, assuming the
sign of w1 is positive. This assumption is reasonable because depreciation of domestic
currency increases net export, and accordingly the output gap improves.
Equation (2.5) is the New Keynesian Phillips Curve (NKPC) in a small open economy,
which di#ers from a closed economy counterpart in that the coe$cient of the output gap
depends on the degree of openness and there is a domestic inﬂation rate instead of CPI
inﬂation. Note that for g0, the slope coe$cient is absolutely identical to that of a closed
economy NKPC. The degree of openness has an inﬂuence on inﬂation dynamics by only the
size of the slope of the output gap.
6
5 More concretely, * is the inverse of the elasticity of supplying goods, s is the inverse of the intertemporal
elasticity of substitution in consumption, h is the elasticity of substitution between domestic and foreign goods,
and a denotes stickiness of prices following Calvo (1983), which assumes that each ﬁrm resets its price in any
given period only with probability 1a, independently of other ﬁrms and of the time that has elapsed since the
last adjustment.
6 The larger the degree of openness, the smaller the size of the slope of the output gap. This can be explained by
the following logic. Let us assume that the output gap of the rest of the world is constant. Under this assumption,
the increase in the domestic output gap means that the real exchange rate should depreciate in order for market
clearing conditions to hold. The point to note is that if the degree of openness is large, the small size of
depreciation of the real exchange rate is su$cient.
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Under the assumption of complete international ﬁnancial markets, the exchange rate
fulﬁls the interest parity condition,
iti* tEtet1et, (2.7)
where i* t is the foreign short-term nominal interest rate and et is the nominal exchange rate
(the price of foreign currency in terms of home currency). Combining this condition with
equation (2.3) in order to incorporate the domestic inﬂation rate and the real exchange rate,





Etqt1(itEtpH,t1)(i* t Etp* t1). (2.8)
Equation (2.8) says that the present real exchange rate depends on the expected value of itself
and the di#erence between the domestic real interest rate and a real interest rate of the rest of
the world.
4. Zero bound constraint and adverse demand shock
We explicitly introduce the non-negativity constraint ons h o rt-term nominal interest rates,
it  0, (2.9)
like Jung, et al. (2001). In particular, this constraint is very important to an economy that is
under unfavorable circumstances such as that of recent Japan. Woodford (1999) adopts the
condition whereby the mean value of short-term nominal interest rates is no smaller than a
prespeciﬁed positive level. This treatment makes the analysis much simpler, but at the price of
losing reality. Therefore, this paper solves a dynamic optimization problem with explicit
treatment of the non-negativity constraint in a forward-looking model notwithstanding its
nonlinearity.
7
Finally, it is assumed that a large negative demand shock to the natural interest rate in the
initial period, denoted by +
n
0, occurs, so that the natural rate of interest takes a large negative
value in period 0. The natural rate of interest is assumed to converge to its steady state on and








 for t0, (2.10)
where r
n
 is the steady-state value of the natural rate of interest, which is assumed to be
non-negative, and r is a parameter satisfying 0r1.
8
7 Although a number of studies treat the non-negativity in an explicit way, or in an approximate way, they do
not satisfactorily present enough to investigate how long a central bank should continue a ZIRP. Fuhrer and
Madigan (1997) and Reifschneider and Williams (2000) do not solve an optimization problem, but just assume
Taylor-type policy rules for setting the nominal interest rate with alternative inﬂation targets. Orphanides and
Wieland (2000) solve a dynamic optimization problem with a non-negativity constraint in a backward-looking
model instead of a forward-looking model.
8 The assumption about the natural rate of interest like (2.10) is su$cient to fulﬁll the purpose of the present
paper, which is to specify the optimal path of nominal interest rate in case of the occurrence of a one-time large
negative demand shock.
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1. First-order conditions and steady-state values
The central bank minimizes equation (2.1) subject to (2.4), (2.5), (2.8) and (2.9). For
convenience, we assume that the short-term real interest rate of the rest of the world is
equivalent to the steady-state value of the natural rate of interest (i.e. r
n
i* t Etp* t1). The










































where f1t and f2t represent the Lagrange multipliers associated with the IS constraint and the
AS constraint, respectively. The ﬁrst-order conditions with respect to pH,t, xt and it are
pH,tp ¯ Hf2t0 (3.2)
l(xtx ¯ )f1tkf2t0 (3.3)
itf1t0; it0; f1t0 (3.4)
Equation (3.4) is the Kuhn-Tucker condition regarding the non-negativity constraint on the
nominal interest rate. If the non-negativity constraint is not binding, (L/(it is equal to zero, so
that f1t is zero also. On the other hand, if the constraint is binding, (L/(it is non-negative, and
so is f1t. The ﬁrst-order conditions consist of equations (3.2)-(3.4), together with IS and AS
equations.
The steady-state value of the various variables under discretionary policy, x, pH,, i,
f1, and f2 are calculated by substituting constant values for each variable into the above
ﬁrst-order conditions. For convenience, we assume that x ¯ (1b)k
1p ¯ H.
9 The interior solu-
tion of steady state values is given by
10
x(1b)k
1p ¯ H; pH,p ¯ H; ir
n
p ¯ H; f10; f20. (3.5)
2. Dynamic path
Given that the non-negativity constraint on nominal interest rates is not binding in the
interior steady-state solution, and the assumption that the natural rate of interest converges
monotonically to its steady-state value, it is straightforward to assume that the non-negativity
9 Without this assumption, the steady-state values take di#erent values, which are more complicated by the
dependence on x ¯ . However, this assumption does not change the results of our analysis below.




; pH,. It is assumed in this paper that r
n
 and p ¯ H are su$ciently large, so that the
dynamic path of the endogenous variables converging to the interior solution is superior to that converging to the
corner solution. Moreover, it is important to note that the interior solution is the ﬁrst-best outcome, in the sense
that the value of the central bank’s loss function, deﬁned by (2.2), is equal to zero. Thus, the focus of our interest
is on the dynamic path that converges to the interior solution.
[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +-.constraint is binding until some period, denoted by period T
d, but not binding afterwards.
In determining the responses of the path of the endogenous variables to shocks, it is
convenient to work in terms of deviations from steady-state values. Thus we deﬁne p ˆ H,tpH,t
pH, and x ˆ txtx and rewrite IS and AS equations, together with ﬁrst-order conditions.
And then, we substitute f1t into (3.2) and (3.3) so as to characterize the path of the
endogenous variables for the periods on and after T
d1 and eliminate f2t. This procedure
yields two ﬁrst-order di#erence equations of the form,





2)p ˆ H,t for tT
d1,, (3.7)
combined with IS and AS equations. It is easy to see that equation (3.7) has a unique bounded
solution, which is given by p ˆ H,t0, from the fact that the coe$cient of p ˆ H,t on the right-hand
side is greater than unity. Applying this to equation (3.6) and the IS equation, we obtain the
following unique bounded solution for tT
d1,










p ¯ H for tT
d1,, (3.9)
where zt[p ˆ H,t x ˆ H] . Equation (3.9) seems to be complicated and strange at ﬁrst glance.
However, noting that r
n
 is the real interest rate in the rest of the world, we easily recognize
that the right-hand side of (3.9) is the weighted average of the natural rate of interest and the
world real interest rate. Substituting w1 into (3.9), we obtain a familiar equation, which
often appears in a closed economy.
11
Next, we substitute it0 into IS and AS equations for the periods during which a ZIRP














































 p ¯ H] . (3.11)
The remaining work is to conﬁrm that f1t is positive for t0, , T





wp ¯ H. Otherwise, both p ˆ H,T d and p ˆ T d will be positive from the monotonic
structure of shocks and (3.11), so that f1t will be negative, contracting the Kuhn-Tucker
condition. Therefore, the positiveness of f1t is well satisﬁed for the periods of ZIRP. It is also




wp ¯ H by recalling (3.9). It is important to
11 It is also noted that if the central bank sets a nominal interest rate equal to the right-hand side of (3.9) at all
times, it can completely stabilize domestic inﬂation and the output gap, thereby achieving the minimized loss in
terms of the central bank’s preference.
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d is di#erent from that of a closed economy, in which the criterion
for choosing T
d is zero. But in this open economy, the choice of T
d is taken in some negative
value of the demand shock, which is proportionate to the size of openness and domestic
inﬂation targeting
3. Implementation
Given the solution characterized in the previous subsection, the next issue we address is
how to implement it. To deal with the problem of indeterminacy which has been pointed out
by many economists, the central bank needs to adopt a feedback policy rule in which a policy
instrument depends on endogenous variables. As an example of such feedback rules, consider
itmax{i
d
tqp(p ˆ H,tp ˆ
d







H,t, and p ˆ
d
t are the solution, which is characterized in the previous subsection, and qp
and qx are positive parameters representing the responsiveness of the short-term nominal
interest rate to the deviations of p ˆ H,t and p ˆ t from the solution. When the central bank







p ˆ H,t, x ˆ t}, simultaneously with the choice of it. It is important to note that equation (3.12)
describes the “o#-equilibrium path” of the short-term nominal interest rate, in that it speciﬁes
how the central bank behaves when the economy deviates from the solution.




H,t, and x ˆ
d
t but converges
to the same interior steady-state value. Since it converges to r
n
p ¯ H, which is positive,
T[0, ] must exist such that it0f o rtT1. Then, the system of equations consisting of









































Since p ˆ H,t and x ˆ t are both non-predetermined variables, this di#erence equation has a unique
bounded solution if the matrix R has two eigenvalues outside the unit circle, according to
proposition 1 in Blanchard and Kahn (1980). The condition for determinacy in the present
case is given by
k(qp1)(1b)qx0. (3.14)
Therefore, a unique bounded solution is obtained if qp1a n dqx0. The satisfaction of these





H,t, and x ˆ
d
t but converges to the same interior steady-state value.
12
12 It is also noteworthy that the larger the degree of openness, the broader the region of parameters in which
the condition of determinacy holds. Condition (3.14) for determinacy is a simple reﬂection of NKPC in a small
open economy, which means that each unit permanent increase in the domestic inﬂation rate implies a permanent
increase in output gap by (1b)/k units, and that the compensation in terms of output gap for the increase in the
domestic inﬂation rate decreases in accordance with the degree of openness.
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1. First-order conditions and steady-state values





itf1t0; it0; f1t0 (4.3)
obtained by di#erentiating the Lagrangean, given by equation (3.1), with respect to pH,t, xt and
it respectively. Note that the lagged Lagrangean multipliers, f1t1 and f2t1, appear in the ﬁrst
two equations out of the ﬁrst-order conditions, which di#er sharply from those obtained in the
discretionary monetary policy.
In order to solve the optimization problem, we need to specify the values of the two
multipliers in the initial period, i.e., add the stipulation that
f110; f210. (4.4)
These initial conditions stem from the assumption that the economy is in the interior
steady-state before period 0. Therefore, the Lagrange multipliers in these periods should be
equal to zero.
13
Next, we need to specify the steady-state values of the endogenous variables. The same
procedure as mentioned in the previous section allows us to obtain the interior solution given
by (3.5). In this case, however, the corner solution does not satisfy the requirement of the
steady-state values because f is negative, which is inconsistent with the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions.
14 Thus, the interior solution is a unique steady-state in the case of commitment.
2. Optimal dynamic path
We adopt the same method as in the previous section. It is assumed that the non-
negativity constraint on the nominal interest rate is binding until some period, denoted by T
c,
but not thereafter. To characterize the path of the endogenous variables for the periods on and
after T
c2, we substitute f1T c1f1T c20 into the ﬁrst-order conditions. Then we
obtain a unique bounded solution that converges to the interior steady-state, which is given by
15
13 It is also noticeable that time-inconsistency of the Barro-Gordon type that could arise in dynamic response to
shocks, which is emphasized in Woodford (1999) and Clarida et al. (1999), does not occur here. The reason is
that the assumption that x ¯ (1b)k
1p ¯ H, which is made in the previous section, holds. This can be shown as
follows. The optimal commitment plan is time-consistent only if f1t0a n df2t0 for all t. Substituting these
values into the above ﬁrst-order conditions, together with the IS and AS equations, we see that p ˆ H,tx ˆ 0 for all t
only if it is set as equation (3.9). Namely, the solution under commitment always coincides with the one under
discretion.




15 Details on the derivation are provided in the Appendix A










p ¯ Hdf2t1 (4.7)
where m1 is a real eigenvalue of an associated matrix, satisfying m11,b is a column vector
deﬁned by b[1m1 km1l
1] , and g is a parameter deﬁned by dm1(1m1)
(1ksl
1wl
1). Note that we need the value of f2T c1 as an initial condition in order to
complete the solution for tT
c2,	.
Next, we characterize the path of the endogenous variables for t0,	,T
c. Substituting i


























where ft[f1t f2t] ,a n dC and D are 2
2 matrices given in Appendix A. Note that we need
the value of zT
c1 as a terminal condition, and the value of f1 as an initial condition.
Finally, for tT












where F, G, and H are matrices given in the Appendix A. Note that we need the values of zT c2
and fT c to complete the solution for tT
c1.
Equations (4.5)-(4.10), the Kuhn-Tucker conditions (i.e., it0f o rt0,	,T
c, and f1t0
for tT
c1,	), and the initial condition (4.5) are completely characterized by a unique
optimal path of the endogenous variables. It should be noted that the jumping variables, pt and
xt, depend on the current and past values of the Lagrange multipliers. This sharply contrasts
with the case of discretion in which the path of the jumping variables is determined solely by
the path of the natural rate of interest, which is exogenously given. An important implication
of this di#erence is that the timing to terminate a ZIRP is endogenously determined in the
commitment solution, while it is exogenously determined in the case of discretion.
The same argument as in Section 3.3 guarantees that the commitment solution character-




tqp(p ˆ H,tp ˆ
c







H,t, and x ˆ
c
t represent the commitment solution, and qp and qx are parameters
satisfying qp1a n dqx0.
3. Timing to terminate the ZIRP and degree of openness
To investigate the relation between timing to terminate a ZIRP and degree of openness,
we need to make a careful observation of equation (4.12). We eliminate f2t from equations




1f1t2kp ˆ H,tlx ˆ tlx ˆ t1
for t0,,T
c1, (4.12)
where initial conditions are given by f11f120. A unique solution to this di#erence
equation is given by











and L is a lag operator, and h1 and h2 are two real solutions to the characteristic equation,
satisfying h11 and 0h21. Since h1 is greater than unity, f1t tends to explode once it
becomes positive, unless the right-hand side of equation (4.12) takes su$ciently large negative
values. In other words, inﬂation and the output gap must overshoot the steady-state values
(i.e., zero) after they take negative values in period 0 and subsequent periods. This condition
is satisﬁed if the central bank continues the ZIRP for a su$ciently long period. By adopting
such a policy, the output gap and inﬂation become su$ciently high, so that the expression on
the right-hand side of (4.12) takes su$ciently large negative values to guarantee that f1t
converges to zero within a ﬁnite period.
Noting that inﬂation and the output gap can be rewritten as a function of a sequence of

















































which means that inﬂation and the output gap in the small openness case overshoot the
steady-state values more than in the large openness case. Therefore, a ZIRP in the case of small






16 The deﬁnition of A(L) is exactly equivalent to that of (4.13)
17 See Appendix B for more details on the derivation of (4.14) and (4.15)




s indicate the timing to terminate a ZIRP in the case of large and small
openness, respectively.
V Numerical Example
In this section, we present some quantitative results, in particular, the optimal path of the
short-term nominal interest rates, using the parameter values shown in Table 1. These
parameters are borrowed from Woodford (1999), except the values of r
n
 and h.T h e
steady-state value of the natural rate of interest (r
n
) is calculated under the assumption that
the growth rate of potential output is three percent per year.
18 The value of h is set equal to
9 so as to satisfy the sign condition of w1. As another candidate in the parameters, we set
s equal to 1, which corresponds to a log utility speciﬁcation, and h3 reasonably. The value
of a, which is consistent with Buchi and Watanabe (2001) and Gali and Gertler (1999), is set
equal to 0.826 in order to make the value of k equal to that in Jung, et al. (2001). The values
of parameters are adjusted so that the length of a period in our model is interpreted as a
quarter.
Figure 1 shows the responses of endogenous variables to an adverse demand shock to the
natural rate of interest under discretion. The solid line and dashed line represent the impulse
responses in the case of g0.7 (large openness) and g0.1 (small openness), respectively. In
the baseline case, shown in this ﬁgure, we assume that the initial shock to the natural rate of
interest, +
n
0 in equation (2.10), is equal to -0.15, which means a 60 percent decline in the
annualized natural rate of interest. In addition, we assume that the persistence of the shock,
which is represented by r in equation (2.10), is 0.5 per quarter. The path of the natural rate
of interest is shown at the bottom of Figure 1.
19 As concretely seen by Figure 1, the short-term
nominal interest rate in the case of large openness is set to zero for the ﬁrst three periods until
period 2, while, in the case of small openness, it is set to zero for the longer periods by a
quarter. It is noteworthy that, before the natural rate of interest turns positive, the nominal
interest rate is positive, which is in sharp contrast to that in a closed economy. By recalling
equation (3.9), understanding is straightforward.
Figure 2 plots the corresponding impulse response functions of endogenous variables
18 The deﬁnition of r
n








t is the natural rate of
output or potential output and gt is a disturbance that ﬂuctuates independently of changes in the real interest rate.
See Jung et al. (2001) for more details.
19 The path of it is denoted by a sequence of circles in Figure 1.
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20 The main features in the case of commitment are as follows. First, an
important di#erence from the case of discretion is that a ZIRP is continued longer. This result
comes from a historical dependent property of commitment, which means that a ZIRP is
continued until the cumulative sum of deviation of the short-term real interest rate from the
natural rate of interest is zero. This prolonged ZIRP lowers the long-term interest rate and
heightens expected inﬂation, thereby stimulating aggregate demand.
20 A key part in computing the commitment solution is how to ﬁnd the timing to terminate a zero interest rate
policy, T
c. We search T
c as follows: (1) We set T
c at a su$ciently high value, say 50, under which f1T c is
supposed to be negative, and compute the path of the variables; (2) If f1T c is negative, we try T
c49; and
(3) We repeat this until f1T c becomes non-negative.





00.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.30
g0 . 7 12233
0 . 5 12233
0 . 3 12233
0 . 1 12334





00.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.30
g0 . 7 13456
0 . 5 23456
0 . 3 24556
0 . 1 24567
0 . 0 24567
Note: r0.5, s0.157, h9.
T67A: 3. V6G>DJH P:GH>HI:C8: D; S=D8@
T
d
r0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7
g0 . 7 00125
0 . 5 00125
0 . 3 00125
0 . 1 00136
0 . 0 00136
T
c
r0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7
g0 . 7 12347
0 . 5 22347
0 . 3 22358
0 . 1 22358
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the ﬁrst few periods and subsequently less overheated than those in the case of small openness.
By making a closer observation of the NKPC and the IS equation, this result is easily
understood. Note that the larger the degree of openness, the weaker the demand shock to the
natural rate of interest. Then, at the initial period, inﬂation and the output gap to demand
shock in the case of large openness decrease less than those in the other case. Since a ZIRP
persists for a while and the trade-o# between inﬂation and the output gap becomes favorable
according to the degree of openness, the dynamic path of inﬂation and the output gap goes into
reverse at some time or other.
Thirdly, a ZIRP in the case of small openness is continued longer than that in the case of
large openness as under discretion. The short-term nominal interest rate in the case of large





00.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.30
g0 . 7 00112
0 . 5 00112
0 . 3 01122
0 . 1 01223





00.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.30
g0 . 7 01234
0 . 5 01234
0 . 3 02345
0 . 1 13457
0 . 0 24568
Note: r0.5, s1, h3.
T67A: 5. V6G>DJH P:GH>HI:C8: D; S=D8@
T
d
r0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7
g0 . 7 00012
0 . 5 00012
0 . 3 00013
0 . 1 00124
0 . 0 00125
T
c
r0.0 0.1 0.3 0.5 0.7
g0 . 7 00124
0 . 5 01134
0 . 3 11235
0 . 1 12248




[December =>IDIHJ76H=> ?DJGC6A D; :8DCDB>8H +..openness is set to zero for the ﬁrst ﬁve periods until period 4, while, in the other case, it is set
to zero for the longer periods by a quarter. It is important to note that the cumulative sum of
the deviation of the short-term nominal interest rate from the weighted average of the natural
rate of interest and the world real interest rate becomes proportionately smaller to the degree
of openness through the foreign e#ect. This also justiﬁes the fact that, in the case of large
openness, the short-term nominal interest rate is positive in period 5 when the natural rate of
interest turns positive, which is inconsistent with Jung et al. (2001).
Table 2 presents T
d and T
c for various combination of the degree of openness(g)a n d
initial shock (+
n
0) in the case of r0.5, s0.157 and h9. Given the value of g, both T
d and
T
c become larger with the absolute value of +
n
0. And both T
d and T
c become smaller with g,
given the value of +
n
0. The response of T
d and T
c to g is not as sensitive. In particular, when +
n
0
is 0.05, 0.10 or 0.20, T
d is constant, independent of the degree of openness. The reason
for the lesser sensitivity to g is that w is small under the parameter conﬁguration of s and h.
Likewise, Table 3 presents T
d and T
c for various combination of the degree of openness
(g) and persistence of shock(r) in the case of +
n
00.15, s0.157 and h9. Given the value
of g, both T
d and T
c become larger with the value of r. And both T
d and T
c become smaller
with g, given the value of r. If a shock to the natural rate of interest is non-persistent, the
responses of T
d and T
c to g are insensitive. On the other hand, in the case of large persistence,
the di#erence in the responses is clear to some extent. Table 4a n dTable 5 present T
d and T
c of r1a n dh3, ceteris paribus. It is easy to see the same pattern of T
d and T
c as Table 2
and Table 3. However, in this case, since the value of w is large, the responses of T
d and T
c to
the degree of openness become somewhat distinct, except T
d in the case of r0.0 and 0.1,
shown in Table 5. In particular, if a shock to the natural rate of interest has great persistence
or has such a large negative initial value, the change of T
c to g becomes distinct.
Moreover, we ﬁnd that the di#erence between T
d and T
c becomes proportionately smaller
to the degree of openness from Table 2-5. While the di#erence between T
d and T
c is about 0-3
quarters in the case of g0.7, it ranges between 1 and 4 in the case of g0.1. Table 4, for
example, shows that as g becomes larger from 0 until 7 in the case of +
n
0, the di#erence between
T
d and T
c decreases gradually from 5 until 2.
VI Comparison with Svensson’s Foolproof Way
In this section we discuss the proposal of pegging the exchange rate by Svensson (2000)
within the framework of the present model. Svensson (2000) recommends that a central bank
in a liquidity trap should announce an upward-sloping price-level target path with a small
positive long-run inﬂation target and, simultaneously, announce that the home currency will be
devalued and that the exchange rate will be pegged to a crawling exchange-rate target until the
price-target path has been reached. That is, the central bank makes a commitment to buy and
sell unlimited amounts of foreign currency at the exchange rate target.
Assuming that uncovered interest parity holds exactly, we can rewrite the proposal of





Etqt1EtpH,t1p ¯ H. (6.1)
2004] I=: O:GD->CI:G:HI-G6I: 7DJC9 6C9 DEI>B6A BDC:I6GN EDA>8N >C 6 HB6AA DE:C :8DCDBN +./Under the proposal of Svensson (2000), i.e., equation (6.1), we can construct a Lagrangean
for solving an optimization problem and obtain the ﬁrst-order conditions, which are the same
as those in the case of commitment. By making the same simulation with earlier analysis, we
ﬁnd that the timing to terminate the ZIRP (T
c) is always zero, independent of the size of the
demand shock. As required by the UIP condition, the nominal interest rate jumps to a positive
level immediately upon the start of the crawling peg, which is the so-called foolproof way. This
result can be easily proved without solving the optimization problem. Combining equation
(6.1) with the UIP condition, we obtain the equation of the form, itp ¯ Hi* t p* (in the
present paper, itp ¯ Hr
n
). This implies that, from the initial period, the zero bound on the




ZIRP is quickly ended and the nominal interest rate remains well in the positive by taking the
crawling peg, which needs its credibility to be absolutely essential.
22
VII Conclusion
To address the question of how long the ZIRP would be continued in the framework of
a small open economy, we solved a central bank’s intertemporal optimization problem. Given
an adverse shock to aggregate demand, we have computed the dynamic path of the short-term
nominal interest rate in both discretion and commitment. We found that the timing to
terminate a ZIRP in the case of large openness would be earlier than that in the case of small
openness. We also found that the economy in the case of large openness would be less
overheated.
Notwithstanding the use of the exchange rate channel of monetary policy, the solution is
that the ZIRP should be continued until the cumulative sum of deviation of the short-term real
interest rate from the natural rate of interest is zero. This shows that the BOJ’s announcement
still lacks the element of history dependence because it focuses only on a forward looking
stance. However, the di#erence between the optimal solution and the BOJ’s policy in
termination timing becomes proportionately smaller to the degree of openness. Nevertheless,
noting that Japan’s exports and imports were about 11 and 10 percent of the GDP in 2001
respectively, the BOJ’s termination timing might be premature, even though it had taken the
exchange rate channel into account.
This paper also suggests that the exchange rate peg enables the central bank to quickly end
the ZIRP and a positive nominal interest rate to be an equilibrium, under the condition that
the credibility of the peg is absolutely established. This implies that, if the termination of the
ZIRP is accompanied by the exchange rate peg, its e#ect is intensiﬁed. However, the BOJ was
skeptical about the exchange rate peg in spite of its perception that the transmission mecha-
nism of the interest rate to the exchange rate would be limited.
21 Combining itp ¯ Hi* tp* with the IS equation and establishing a new Lagrangean, we easily ﬁnd that
Kuhn-Tucker conditions are excluded from the ﬁrst-order conditions.
22 Svensson (2003) says that the exchange peg can induce private-sector expectations of a higher future price
level because the present exchange rate is directly related to the expected future exchange rate, which is also
related to private-sector expectations of the future price level. Another important thing to note is that the peg may
have a negative e#ect on the trading partners, which must be discussed in more detail.
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This section characterizes the optimal path under commitment. We start by characteriz-
ing the path of the endogenous variables for the periods on and after T
c2. Substituting f1T c1
f1T c20 into (4.1) and (4.2) yields a system of a di#erence equation of the form
p ˆ H,tf2tf2t10 (A.1)
lx ˆ tkf2t0. (A.2)

































where f2T c1 is given as an initial condition. This di#erence equation system has one
predetermined variable, f2, and one non-predetermined variable, p ˆ H, and the two-by-two
matrix on the right-hand side of the equation has two real eigenvalues, which are denoted by
m11a n dm21. Since the number of eigenvalues outside the unit circle is equal to the
number of non-predetermined variables, a unique bounded solution exists that converges to the
interior steady-state, whose dynamic path is given by
p ˆ H,t(1m1)f2t1, (A.4)
f2tm1f2t1. (A.5)
We obtain the optimal path of p ˆ t in the corresponding periods by substituting this solution into
(4.5), and the optimal path of it in the corresponding periods by substituting it into the IS
equation. Equations (4.5)-(4.7) follow from this.
Next, we characterize the path of the endogenous variables for t0,,T
c1. As for
t0,,T
c, we substitute it0 into (2.4) to obtain
x ˆ tx ˆ t1 w
s









This equation, and equations (4.1), (4.2), and (2.5) characterize the optimal path for
t0,,T




















































c1, we substitute f1T c10 into (4.1) and (4.2) to obtain
p ˆ H,Tc1(bs)
1wf1T
cf2T c1f2T c0, (A.9)
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1f1T ckf2T c10. (A.10)




















































B Derivation of (4.14) and (4.15)




2)kx ˆ t (B.1)
where L is the lag operator, p ˆ H,tpH,tpH, and x ˆ txtx. Similarly, we can rewrite the IS
equation as








































































We substitute (A.3) into (A.1) to obtain
C(L)(1bL
1)p ˆ H,tkLt.( B.4)
Multiplying both sides of (4.12) by C(L)(1bL
1)L














1 into (A.5) yields equation (4.14).
We di#erentiate (4.14) with respect to w to obtain





































































2 (p ¯ Hr
n
)0. (B.9)
Noting both (A.8) and (A.9) have postive values, together with the fact that the second term
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